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Abstract. Differential privacy aims at protecting the privacy of participants in statistical databases. Roughly, a mechanism
satisfies differential privacy if the presence or value of a single individual in the database does not significantly change the
likelihood of obtaining a certain answer to any statistical query posed by a data analyst. Differentially-private mechanisms
are often oblivious: first the query is processed on the database to produce a true answer, and then this answer is adequately
randomized before being reported to the data analyst. Ideally, a mechanism should minimize leakage—i.e., obfuscate as much
as possible the link between reported answers and individuals’ data—while maximizing utility—i.e., report answers as similar
as possible to the true ones. These two goals, however, are in conflict with each other, thus imposing a trade-off between privacy
and utility.
In this paper we use quantitative information flow principles to analyze leakage and utility in oblivious differentially-private
mechanisms. We introduce a technique that exploits graph symmetries of the adjacency relation on databases to derive bounds
on the min-entropy leakage of the mechanism. We consider a notion of utility based on identity gain functions, which is closely
related to min-entropy leakage, and we derive bounds for it. Finally, given some graph symmetries, we provide a mechanism
that maximizes utility while preserving the required level of differential privacy.
Keywords: Differential privacy, information flow, min-entropy leakage, gain functions, optimal mechanisms
1. Introduction
Statistical databases store data of a large number of individuals, and data analysts are allowed to pose
statistical queries about these data. Typical such queries include average values, total counting, or the
percentage of the entries that satisfy a given property. Statistical databases are of crucial importance in
many areas. For instance, medical databases can guide pharmacological research, and census databases
can help authorities decide how to spend the budget of years to come. The field of statistical disclosure
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2control concerns the problem of revealing accurate statistics about a set of individuals while preserving
their privacy.
In principle we would like to consider aggregate information as public, and specific information about
any individual as private. However, since the two kinds of information are intrinsically linked, it is not
easy to make available the former without revealing the latter. Consider, for example, a database that
stores the values of the salaries of a set of individuals, and consider the queries “what is the average
salary of the people in the database?” and “how many people are in the database?”. Both queries are
about aggregate information, but by posing them immediately before and after the addition of a new
individual to the database, the data analyst can infer exactly the salary of this individual.
Another important issue is the presence of side information, which is any information about individuals
coming from sources external to the database itself (e.g., from prior beliefs, public sources, newspapers,
or other databases). The combination of statistical queries and suitable side information can pose serious
threats to the privacy of individuals [12].1
To tackle the problem of statistical disclosure control, Dwork has proposed the notion of differential
privacy [12,13,14,15], which has received great attention in the privacy community. Essentially, differen-
tial privacy ensures that the presence or absence of any individual in a database, or changing the data of
any individual, does not significantly affect the probability of obtaining any specific answer for a certain
query. Intuitively, this implies that it is “safe” for an individual to opt in (or out) a database, since their
choice will not significantly affect the information the data analyst will obtain. An important feature of
differential privacy is that it does not depend on side information.
There are several approaches in the literature to implement differentially-private mechanisms. For nu-
meric queries, Dwork has proposed the simple method of adding Laplacian noise to the true answer to
the query [12]. More sophisticated mechanisms correlate noise between queries, enabling more infor-
mation to be extracted from the database while still preserving differential privacy [7,26,18]. For cases
in which perturbing the answer is not an adequate option (e.g. for non-numeric queries), McSherry and
Talwar have proposed the exponential mechanism [25].
Differential privacy relies on the randomization of the query answer, and thus imposes a trade-off
in fulfilling two opposing goals. On one hand, privacy demands the minimization of the amount of
information about the database (and, in particular, about individuals) revealed through the randomized
answers. On the other hand, the mechanism should provide good utility, i.e., some adequate closeness
between true and randomized answers.
In this paper we investigate the quantification of privacy and utility in differentially-private mecha-
nisms, approaching the problem from the perspective of the well-established field of quantitative infor-
mation flow.
Quantitative information flow. Completely secure systems are often impossible to obtain in practice,
either by design or by technological constraints, and thus it is important to quantitatively analyze the
leakage of such systems. The field of quantitative information flow is concerned with the amount of
secret information one can infer from the observable behavior of an execution of a system.
Information theory is widely regarded as a natural framework to provide firm foundations to quanti-
tative information flow. A system can be seen as an information-theoretic channel from secret inputs to
1The combination of answers to statistical queries with side information can affect even the privacy of individuals not present
in the database. For example, if one knows that a certain person’s salary is exactly the same as the average salary of the people
in the database, then the average-salary query will reveal the salary of this person, independently from whether they are in the
database or not.
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the secret. Uncertainty is evaluated through entropy measures, which vary according to the model of ad-
versary and to the way one estimates the success of an attack [24]. One of the main notions of entropy in
quantitative information flow ismin-entropy [27,9,28], which is closely related to the risk of an adversary
guessing the secret correctly in one try.
Independently of the adopted model of adversary and attack, a general principle of quantitative infor-
mation flow is that leakage can be expressed as the difference between the initial uncertainty about the
secret before the system is executed, and the remaining uncertainty after the execution is observed:
information leakage = initial uncertainty − remaining uncertainty.
The observation of the execution is expected to increase the probabilistic knowledge about the secret,
therefore decreasing the corresponding uncertainty and making the equation above non-negative.
Quantitative information flow vs. differential privacy. Both quantitative information flow and differen-
tial privacy measure the protection of sensitive information provided by a mechanism, and in both cases
this measure is linked to the probabilistic knowledge that an adversary gains about the secret from the
outcome of the mechanism. It is therefore natural to ask how they compare, and whether one is preferable
to the other. In our opinion, there is no absolute criterion to prefer one to the other: it depends on the
context in which we want to use a privacy mechanism. One main difference between the two notions
is that quantitative information flow is an average measure, defined in terms of the expected value of
the probability of a successful attack with respect to all possible outcomes, while differential privacy is
concerned with the worst-case, no matter how improbable it may be. Thus differential privacy reflects
the perspective of an individual, for whom the consequences of a privacy breach may be dramatic, while
quantitative information flow could be more suitable for companies, as they can usually amortize the
costs of single incidents, and are more interested in optimizing the trade-off between average costs rather
than avoiding all risks.
Another important difference between quantitative information flow and privacy is that the latter has
a nice compositionality property: the combination of an ǫ1-differentially private and an ǫ2-differentially
private mechanism gives an (ǫ1+ ǫ2)-differentially private mechanism. Hence the degradation of privacy
under composition is controllable. In quantitative information flow there has been some work on the
cascading of channels [16], which however is a rather specific form of composition, and rather different
from the one of differential privacy. More general kinds of composition have been analyzed in [22]
(including the one of differential privacy, under the name of “parallel composition with repeated input”),
and in the context of a process calculus [8], but a neat compositionality result like the one of differential
privacy has not been produced.
Contributions. This work investigates connections between differential privacy and quantitative infor-
mation flow. We note that differentially-private mechanisms can be seen as information-theoretic chan-
nels from databases to reported answers, and we describe—and quantify—the level of privacy and utility
of such mechanisms in terms of entropy min-entropy and leakage. We are motivated by the following
fundamental questions.
1. Does ǫ-differential privacy induce a bound on the information leakage of a mechanism?
2. Does ǫ-differential privacy induce a bound on the utility of a mechanism?
3. Given a query and a value ǫ ≥ 0, can we construct a mechanism satisfying ǫ-differential privacy
and also providing maximum utility?
4To address those questions, we exploit the graph structure of the database domain to derive bounds on
leakage, and, similarly, the graph structure that a query induces on the domain of true answers to derive
bounds on utility. The main contributions of this paper are the following.
– We propose an information-theoretic framework to reason about information leakage and utility in
differentially-private querying mechanisms.
– We explore graph-theoretic properties of the adjacency relation on databases, using two types of
symmetries (distance-regularity and vertex-transitivity) that enable us to prove that differential pri-
vacy induces a bound on min-entropy leakage.
– Furthermore, we prove that this bound is tight, i.e., that there always exists a differentially-private
mechanism that attains this bound.
– We prove that if the graph structure of the answers satisfies our symmetry conditions, then differen-
tial privacy induces a bound on utility, measured in terms of identity gain functions. We also prove
that this bound is tight.
– As a side result, we prove that under the considered symmetry conditions the exponential mechanism
is optimal, i.e., it provides maximum utility for a given degree of privacy.
Finally, we show that the opposite direction of the relation between quantitative information flow and
differential privacy is not possible to establish in general. More precisely, a bound on the min-entropy
leakage of a channel does not necessarily imply a bound on the level of differential privacy of the channel
(i.e., on the parameter ǫ).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review basic concepts of in-
formation theory, quantitative information flow, differential privacy, and graph theory. In Section 3 we
introduce a model for leakage and utility in oblivious differentially-private mechanisms. In Section 4
we exploit graph-symmetries (distance-regularity or vertex-transitivity) of the adjacency relation on the
input to a channel to derive bounds on the a posterior min-entropy of that channel. We then apply this
bound to differentially-private mechanisms to derive our results for leakage in Section 5 and for utility
in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss related work, and in Section 8 we conclude. Full proofs for
all our results can be found in Appendix 8.
A preliminary version of some of the results of this paper appeared in [1] and [2].
2. Preliminaries
2.1. The information-theoretic framework for quantitative information flow
LetA,B denote two discrete random variables with carriersA = {a0, . . . , an−1},B = {b0, . . . , bm−1},
and let π denote a probability distribution on A, called a prior distribution.
An (information-theoretic) channel is a triple (A,B,M), where A is the channel input, B is the chan-
nel output, and M is a channel matrix of conditional probabilities. Each element Ma,b represents the
probability that B takes value b given that A has value a. Together, π and M induce a joint probability
distribution p for A,B, defined as p(a, b) = πaMa,b. Note that p satisfies p(a) = πa and, for values of
π(a) > 0, p(b|a) = Ma,b.
There are several measures of the information shared by A and B via the channel matrix. In this paper
we will concentrate on the measures of vulnerability and min-entropy.
The vulnerability of A is defined as V (A) = maxa∈A p(a), and it represents the probability that an
adversary can correctly guess the value of A in a single try (a rational adversary chooses as a guess a
5value of a with maximum probability). Correspondingly, the conditional vulnerability of A given B is
defined as V (A|B) =
∑
b∈B p(b)V (A|B = b) =
∑
b∈Bmaxa∈A p(a)p(b|a), and it is the probability
that the adversary can correctly guess the value of A in one try after having observed the value of B. It
can be shown that V (A|B)/V (A) ≥ 1, and intuitively this ratio represents by how much the adversary’s
probability of success is increased by the observation of the channel output.
For mathematical convenience, the vulnerability is usually converted into bits by taking its negative
logarithm (in base 2). Themin-entropy ofA is then defined asH∞(A) = − log V (A), and the conditional
min-entropy of A given B is defined as H∞(A|B) = − log V (A|B).
The min-entropy leakage (or simply min-leakage) of A to B is defined as the difference between the
a priori (i.e., before observing the value of B) and the a posteriori (i.e., after observing the value of B)
min-entropies of A: I∞(A;B) = H∞(A) − H∞(A|B) = log V (A|B)/V (A). It can be shown that 0 ≤
I∞(A;B) ≤ H∞(A), and that min-entropy leakage is not symmetric, i.e., that I∞(A;B) 6= I∞(B;A)
in general.
Min-capacity is the worst-case leakage over all input distributions: C∞ = maxπ I∞(A;B). It has been
proven in [9] that C∞ is realized at the uniform distribution, and that it equals the logarithm of the sum
of the maxima of each column in the channel matrix, i.e., C∞ = log
∑
b∈Bmaxa∈A p(b|a).
2.2. Differential Privacy
LetX be the set of all possible databases. Two databases x, x′ ∈ X are adjacent (or neighbors), written
x ∼ x′, if they differ for the presence or the value of exactly one individual. We call ∼ the adjacency
relation on databases. Note that the structure (X ,∼) forms an undirected graph, where vertices are
databases and edges connect every two adjacent databases.
A (differentially-private) mechanism is a probabilistic function K from X to some set of possible
answers Z , satisfying the property that the ratio between the probabilities of two adjacent databases to
give a certain answer is bounded by eǫ, for some ǫ ≥ 0.
Definition 1 ([14]). A mechanism K from X to Z satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, for some ǫ ≥ 0, if for
all pairs x, x′ ∈ X , with x ∼ x′, and all S ⊆ Z:
Pr [K(x) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ · Pr [K(x′) ∈ S]. (1)
Since in this work we consider finite X ,Z , all probability distributions are discrete, and in the above
definition it is sufficient to consider probabilities of the form Pr [K(x) = z].
Intuitively, (1) means that an isolated individual has a negligible influence on a large database. It is
usual to think of ǫ as a constant smaller than 1, so eǫ ≈ (1 + ǫ), and differential privacy ensures a small
multiplicative difference in the distributions generated by neighbor databases.
2.3. Graph theory
Let G = (V,∼) be a (undirected) graph with vertices in V and edges ∼⊆ V × V . We use the infix
notation to denote that two elements w and w′ of V are connected by an edge, i.e., w ∼ w′ stands for
(w,w′) ∈∼. We also say, in this case, that w and w′ are adjacent or neighbors. The distance d(w,w′)
between two connected vertices w,w′ ∈ V is the number of edges in a shortest path connecting them.
We denote by V〈d〉(w) the subset of vertices in V that are at distance d from the vertex w. The diameter
dmax (G) of G is the maximum distance between any two connected vertices in V , i.e., dmax (G) =
6maxw,w′∈V d(w,w′). We denote by ∆G the set {0, 1, . . . , dmax}. When no confusion can arise, we use
dmax and ∆ instead of dmax (G) and ∆G, respectively. The degree of a vertex is the number of edges
incident to it. G is called regular if every vertex has the same degree, and k-regular if all vertices have
degree k. An automorphism of G is a permutation σ on the vertex set V such that for any pair of vertices
w,w′, if w ∼ w′, then σ(w) ∼ σ(w′). The automorphism group ofG is the set of all of its automorphisms.
We denote by σk the composition of σ with itself k times, i.e., σk(w) = σ(σk−1(w)) for k > 0, and
σ0(w) = w.
For the purpose of this paper, we need to consider graphs with certain symmetry properties, namely
the so-called distance-regular graphs, and the vertex-transitive graphs.
Definition 2 (Distance-regular graph [10]). A graphG = (V,∼) is distance-regular if there exist integers
bd and cd (d ∈ {0, . . . , dmax}) (called intersection numbers) such that, for all vertices w,w′ at distance
d(w,w′) = d, there are exactly bd neighbors of w′ in V〈d+1〉(w), and cd neighbors of w
′ in V〈d−1〉(w).
The following proposition gives an alternative characterization of distance-regular graphs:
Proposition 3 ([10]). A graph is distance-regular if, and only if, it is regular and, for any two vertices w
and w′, the cardinality of V〈j〉(w) ∩ V〈k〉(w
′) depends only on j, k, and d(w,w′).
We now define vertex-transitive graphs.
Definition 4 (Vertex-transitive graph). A graph G = (V,∼) is called vertex-transitive if for any pair
w,w′ ∈ V there exists an automorphism σ such that σ(w) = w′.
Many regular graphs are both distance-regular and vertex-transitive. This includes, in particular, the
Hamming graphs, which play an important role in this paper since they are the natural structure of
databases. A Hamming graph is characterized by two natural numbers, u and v, and it is defined as the
graph whose set of nodes are tuples of u elements, where each element can take v different values, and
with an adjacency relation defined by stipulating that two tuples are adjacent if they differ in the value of
exactly one element.
Some examples of graphs that are both distance-regular and vertex-transitive are given in Figure 1. It
is possible to show that Figures 1(a) and 1(b) are (isomorphic to) Hamming graphs, with (u, v) equal to
(1, 4) and (3, 2), respectively.
Distance-regularity and vertex-transitivity, however, are incomparable properties, in the sense that nei-
ther of them implies the other. Figure 2(a) shows one of the Chang graphs, which is distance-regular
and not vertex-transitive, whereas Figure 2(b) shows the truncated tetrahedron, which is an example of a
graph that is vertex-transitive and not distance-regular.
Next, we show that distance-regular and vertex-transitive graphs have the property that, for any given
distance d, the cardinality of V〈d〉(w) is the same for all vertices w, i.e., it depends only on d and not on
w. This property will be relevant for some of the proofs in the paper.
Proposition 5. If a graph G = (V,∼) is distance-regular or vertex-transitive, then, for every distance
d ∈ ∆, there exists a constant nd which is equal to the cardinality of V〈d〉(w) for every w ∈ V .
3. A model of utility and privacy for statistical databases
Let Ind = {0, 1, . . . , u − 1} be a finite set of cardinality u representing the individuals participating
in the database, and let Val = {val0, val1, . . . , valv−1} represent the v different possible values for the
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Fig. 1. Some distance-regular and vertex-transitive graphs
(a) One of the Chang
graphs, which are distance-
regular and not vertex-
transitive
(b) The truncated tetra-
hedron, which is vertex-
transitive and not distance-
regular
Fig. 2. Examples of graphs distinguishing the properties of distance-regularity and vertex-trasitivity
sensitive attribute of each individual (e.g., disease name in a medical database). The case of multiple
sensitive attributes can be modeled simply by considering Val as a set of tuples. The absence of an
individual from the database is modeled by a special value in Val . A database x = x0 . . . xu−1 is a u-tuple
where each xi ∈ Val is the value of the individual i. The set of all databases is, therefore, X = Val
u. As
recalled in previous section, there is a natural graph structure associated to the set of databases, called
Hamming graph. The vertices of this graph are the databases themselves, and the adjacency relation is
defined by x ∼ x′ if, and only if, x and x′ differ in the value of exactly one individual.
A query on the database is a (deterministic) function f : X → Y , where Y is the domain of the true
answers y = f(x) to the query. A (noisy) mechanism for f is a probabilistic mapping K : X → Z ,
where Z represents the domain of the answers reported by the mechanism, and does not necessarily
coincide with Y (cf. Figure 3). We model such a mechanism as a channel (X ,Z,M), where X ,Z are
the channel’s inputs and outputs, respectively, andM is the channel matrix. The definition of differential
privacy is directly expressed as a property of the channel: M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if, and only
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Fig. 4. Leakage and utility for oblivious mechanisms
if,
Mx,z ≤ e
ǫMx′,z for all x, x
′ ∈ X s.t. x ∼ x′, and all z ∈ Z.
For the sake of clarity, sometimes we abuse notation slightly and identify a differentially-private mech-
anism K with its associated matrix M , thus writing Kx,z for the conditional probability Mx,z, assigned
by the channel matrix, that the output is z given that the input is x.
Let Y be a random variable ranging over Y and modeling the true answer to f . The mechanism K
is often oblivious, meaning that the reported answer Z only depends on the true answer Y and not
on the database X. The channel corresponding to an oblivious mechanism K can thus be decomposed
into a channel from X to Y modeling the query f and a noisy channel H from Y to Z modeling the
randomization of the true answer. These two channels are said to be in cascade, since the output of the
first one is the input for the second one, as depicted in Figure 4.
The leakage of the channel associated to the mechanism is a measure of the information about the
database that the adversary can obtain by observing the reported answer, hence it represents a relation
between X and Z . On the other hand, the utility of the mechanism is a measure of how much one can
learn about the true answer from the reported one, hence it represents a relation between Y and Z . Note
that in an oblivious mechanism the utility depends only of the noise channel H.
Following the standard approach in the differential privacy literature [17,21], we represent the adver-
sary’s side information as a prior distribution on X.
94. Relating differential privacy and quantitative information flow
In this section we propose a general technique to derive bounds on the min-entropy leakage of ǫ-
differentially-private channels. The bounds are derived for any channel whose input respects certain
graph regularities. Note that in previous section we have formulated the notion of differential privacy
in terms of a generic graph structure on the input, hence we do not need to assume that the inputs
are databases. In Section 5 we will instantiate this technique to the channel K associated to the whole
mechanism thus obtaining results about leakage, while in Section 6 we will instantiate it to the channel
H, thus obtaining results about utility.
More specifically, given a channel respecting ǫ-differential privacy, we show that if the graph structure
of the channel input is distance-regular or vertex-transitive, it is possible to transform the channel matrix
into a leakage-equivalent matrix with certain structural regularities that immediately allow to derive
bounds on the a posteriori min-entropy of the channel.
We emphasize now an important assumption of our analysis, and its implications.
Remark 6. The bounds in this section are obtained under the assumption that the a priori distribution
on the channel’s input is uniform. This is not a restriction for when applying these bounds to leakage,
since maximum min-entropy leakage is achieved on the uniform input distribution (as seen in Section 2)
and, hence, any bound for the uniform distribution is also a bound for every other input distribution. In
the case of utility the assumption of a uniform input distribution is more restrictive, but we will see that
it still provides interesting results for several practical cases.
4.1. Assumptions and notation
We start by setting some assumptions and notation.
Channels. We consider channels having input A and output B, with finite carriersA = {a0, . . . , an−1}
and B = {b0, . . . , bm−1}, respectively. The probability distribution of A is assumed to be uniform.
Furthermore, we assume that |A| = n ≤ |B| = m. (where | · | represents the cardinality of a set). The
latter assumption is without loss of generality, because if n > m we can add to the matrix enough all-
zero columns (i.e., columns containing only 0’s), so as to match the number of rows. Note that adding
all-zero columns does not change the min-entropy leakage of the channel.
We assume an adjacency relation ∼ on A, so that the structure (A,∼) is a (undirected) graph.
For simplicity, we will often (and especially in the proofs) represent the elements of A and B by their
indexes, i.e., we will use the natural numbers i, j to denote ai, bj , respectively. We will also write i ∼ h to
mean ai ∼ ah, and d(i, h) to denote d(ai, ah), i.e., the distance between ai and ah in the graph structure.
We use M , M ′, M ′′ or N to range over channels. Since we represent the elements of A (resp. B) by
their indexes, typically the rows and the columns of the channels will be indexed by natural numbers
from 0 to n− 1 (resp.m− 1). We typically use i, h, l to range over rows, and j, k to range over columns.
Given a matrixM , we denote by maxMj the maximum value of column j over all rows i, i.e., max
M
j =
maxiMi,j , and by max
M = maxi,j Mi,j the maximum element of the matrix.
Recall that a channel matrix M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if, for each column j and for each pair
of rows i and h such that i ∼ h, we have
1
eǫ
≤
Mi,j
Mh,j
≤ eǫ.
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When necessary to avoid confusion, we annotate the a posteriori min-entropy and the min-entropy
leakage with the channel M they refer to. I.e., we use the notation HM∞ (A|B) and I
M
∞ (A;B), respec-
tively.
Assumptions on the prior. An important feature of differential privacy is that its definition abstracts
from prior information, allowing to show that a mechanism is differentially private without making as-
sumptions on the prior. Nevertheless, prior information still plays an important role on the guarantees that
are actually provided: for several natural privacy properties that one might want to enforce (eg. a bound
on the adversary’s probability of guessing an individual’s data), we commonly find that differentially
private mechanisms cannot guarantee them unless assumptions are made on the prior. For instance, Kifer
and Machanavajjhala [23] argue that the privacy guarantees generally expected from a differentially pri-
vate mechanism might be violated if the database presents correlations among individual records. Such
guarantees depend on an assumption on the prior: the lack of correlations between individuals.
In this paper we study privacy guarantees imposed by differential privacy, expressed in terms of mea-
sures from quantitative information flow, in particular conditional min-entropy H∞ and min-entropy
leakage I∞. Although both measures depend on the prior, in our results there is a sharp difference be-
tween the two: results based on conditional min-entropy, such as Theorem 12, rely on the strong as-
sumption of a uniform prior. This is in accordance to the discussion above: the adversary’s probability
of guessing the secret (expressed by min-entropy) cannot be bounded without assumptions on the prior.
Results based on leakage, on the other hand, such as Theorem 15, make no such assumptions. This some-
what surprising behaviour is due to the way leakage is defined. Prior information might make the secret
more vulnerable, but this happens both a priori and a posteriori. Leakage compares the two, measuring
how much vulnerability is affected because of the mechanism. As a consequence, min-entropy leakage
is maximized on a uniform prior, hence the bounds we provide hold for all priors.
4.2. The matrix transformation
Considering a channel matrix M having at least as many columns as rows, and assuming an uniform
input distribution, the transformation on the channel matrix is divided into two steps. First, M is con-
verted into a matrix M ′ in which each of the first n columns has a maximum in the diagonal, and the
remaining columns are all 0’s.
Then, we note that all-zero columns do not contribute to the a posteriori min-entropy leakage of the
channel, nor to its min-entropy leakage, and, for simplicity, we erase them from M ′. The result is a
square matrix of dimension n× n.
Second, under the assumption that the input domain is distance-regular or vertex-transitive, M ′ is
converted into a matrix M ′′ which has the same maximum leakage, is still ǫ-differentially private, and
has all the elements of the diagonal equal to its maximum element maxM
′′
.
A scheme of the transformation is shown in Figure 5, where Lemma 7 (Step 1) is the first step of our
transformation, and the second is step either Lemma 8 (Step 2a) or Lemma 9 (Step 2b), depending on
whether the graph structure is distance-regular or vertex-transitive, respectively.
Lemma 7. (Step 1) Let M be a channel matrix of dimensions n × m s.t. n ≤ m, and assume that
M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Then it is possible to transform M into a matrix M ′ of the same
dimensions satisfying the following conditions:
(i) M ′ is a channel matrix:
∑m−1
j=0 M
′
i,j = 1, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(ii) each of the first n columns has a maximum in the diagonal: M ′i,i = max
M ′
i , for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
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M =


M0,0 M0,1 . . . M0,m−1
M1,0 M1,1 . . . M1,m−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mn−1,0 Mn−1,1 . . . Mn−1,m−1


Step 1: move column maxima to diagonal
(any graph structure)
M ′ =


max
M ′
0
− . . . − 0 . . . 0
− maxM
′
1
. . . − 0 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
− − . . . maxM
′
n−1 0 . . . 0


Erase all-zero columns
M ′ =


max
M ′
0
− . . . −
− maxM
′
1
. . . −
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
− − . . . maxM
′
n−1


Step 2a: average column maxima
(distance-regular graph)
Step 2b: average column maxima
(vertex-transitive graph)
M ′′ =


max
M ′′ − . . . −
− maxM
′′
. . . −
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
− − . . . maxM
′′


Fig. 5. Matrix transformation for distance-regular and vertex-transitive graphs
(iii) them− n last columns only contain 0’s: M ′i,j = 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and all n ≤ j ≤ m− 1;
(iv) M ′ satisfies ǫ-differential privacy: M ′i,j ≤ e
ǫM ′h,j , for all 0 ≤ i, h ≤ n − 1 s.t. i ∼ h and all
0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1; and
(v) HM
′
∞ (A|B) = H
M
∞ (A|B), if A has the uniform distribution.
Lemma 8. (Step 2a) LetM ′ be a square channel matrix of dimensions n× n that satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy. Let ∼ be an adjacency relation on A such that the graph (A,∼) is connected and distance-
regular. Assume that the maximum value of each column is on the diagonal, i.e., Mi,i = maxMi for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Then it is possible to transform M ′ into a matrix M ′′ of the same dimension satisfying
the following conditions:
(i) M ′′ is a channel matrix:
∑n−1
j=0 M
′′
i,j = 1, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(ii) the elements of the diagonal are all the same, and are equal to the maximum of the matrix: M ′′i,i =
maxM
′′
, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(iii) M ′′ satisfies ǫ-differential privacy: M ′i,j ≤ e
ǫM ′h,j , for all 0 ≤ i, h, j ≤ n− 1 s.t. i ∼ h; and
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(iv) HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = H
M ′
∞ (A|B), if A has the uniform distribution.
Lemma 9. (Step 2b) Consider a square channel matrix M ′ satisfying the assumptions of Lemma 8,
except that we assume (A,∼) to be vertex-transitive instead of distance-regular. Then it is possible to
transform M ′ into a matrixM ′′ with the same properties as in Lemma 8.
4.3. The bound on the a posteriori entropy of the channel
Once the transformation has been applied, and the channel matrix respects the properties of M ′′ as
in Figure 5, we use the graph structure of (A,∼) to determine a bound on the a posteriori entropy
HM
′′
∞ (A|B). Since the matrix transformation preserves its a posteriori conditional min-entropy, the
bound obtained is also valid for the original channel matrixM .
It is a known result in the literature (cfr. [9]) that when the distribution of A is uniform, the a posteriori
min-entropy of a channelM ′′ is given by
HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = − log
1
n
∑
j∈B
maxM
′′
j . (2)
Given that the diagonal elements of the matrixM ′′ are all equal to the maximum maxM
′′
, (2) becomes
HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = − log max
M ′′ , (3)
and finding a bound on the a posteriori entropy of the channelM ′′ reduces to finding a bound onmaxM
′′
.
We proceed by noting that ǫ-differential privacy induces a relation between the ratio of elements at any
distance (rather than only for neighbor elements at distance 1).
Remark 10. Let M be a matrix satisfying ǫ-differential privacy. Then, for any column j, and any pair
of rows i and h we have that:
1
eǫ d(i,h)
≤
Mi,j
Mh,j
≤ eǫ d(i,h). (4)
In particular, by taking h = j in (4), and since the elements on the diagonal of M ′′ are equal to the
maximum, we obtain that, for each elementM ′′i,j ,
maxM
′′
≤ eǫ d(i,j)M ′′i,j. (5)
Intuitively, (5) means that the value of maxM
′′
cannot be increased by arbitrarily grabbing probability
mass from other elements in the same line in M ′′, since ǫ-differential privacy imposes a maximum
ratio between any two elements in the same column of the matrix. This observation motivates the next
proposition. (Recall that A〈d〉(i) is the set of nodes j ∈ A at distance d from i ∈ A, and we use | · | to
denote the cardinality of a set. Moreover, ∆ is the set of all possible distances between elements of A.)
Proposition 11. Let M be a channel matrix satisfying ǫ-differential privacy where for every 0 ≤ i ≤
n− 1 we have Mi,i = maxM . Then, for every node i ∈ A,
maxM ≤ 1∑
d∈∆
|A〈d〉(i)|
eǫd
,
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Proposition 11 can be made more precise when the graph structure of the channel input is vertex-
transitive or distance-regular. By Proposition 5, in such graphs, for every distance d ∈ ∆, the value of
|A〈d〉(i)| is the same for every element i ∈ A, it and depends only on d. We recall that such value is
denoted by nd.
Putting together the steps above, we obtain the main result in this section.
Theorem 12. Consider a channel matrix M satisfying ǫ-differential privacy for some ǫ ≥ 0, assume
that the probability distribution on A is uniform, and that (A,∼) is either distance-regular or vertex-
transitive. Then
HM∞ (A|B) ≥ − log
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
. (6)
In case the matrix M can be transformed via Lemmata 7, 8, and 9 into a matrix M ′′ whose elements
all satisfy (5) with equality, then the bound (6) holds with equality.
5. Application to leakage
We measure the leakage of a differentially-private mechanism as the the min-entropy leakage of the
channel from X (databases) to Z (reported answers) of Figure 4. In this section we show that the graph
structure (X ,∼) of the database domain presents the required symmetries (distance-regularity or vertex-
transitivity) for the matrix transformation from the previous section, so we can instantiate our bound for
the posterior min-entropy to the particular channel from X to Z .
As emphasized in Remark 6, min-entropy leakage is maximum when the input distribution is uniform,
so the bounds derived in this section (Theorem 15, Proposition 20, and Proposition 21) are valid for all
distributions on inputs. Moreover, since we model side information as input distributions, it follows that
these bounds are valid for any side information the adversary may have.
5.1. Graph symmetries of the database domain
We recall that the graph structure of the database domain (X ,∼) is a Hamming graph. Since Hamming
graphs present the symmetries of distance-regularity and vertex-transitivity (cfr. [20,10]), and so does
(X ,∼).
Proposition 13. If v ≥ 2, the graph (Valu,∼) is a connected distance-regular graph with diameter
dmax = u, and intersection numbers bd = (u− d)(v − 1) and cd = d, for all 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax .
Proposition 14. The graph (Valu,∼) is a vertex-transitive graph.
The relation between graph structures we consider in this paper is summarized in Figure 6. Figure 7
displays two examples of database structures (Valu,∼). Note that when |Val | = 2, (Valu,∼) is the
u-dimensional hypercube.
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Dist-regular Vertex-transitiveValu
Fig. 6. Venn diagram for the classes of graphs considered in Section 5.1.
aaaa aaab
abababaa
aaba aabb
abbbabba
baaa baab
bbabbbaa
baba babb
bbbbbbba
(a) u = 4,Val = {a, b} (4-
dimensional hypercube)
aaa
aba
aca
aab
abb
acb
aac
abc
acc
baa
bba
bca
caa
cba
cca bcb
bccccb
ccc
(b) u = 3,Val = {a, b, c} (for read-
ability sake we only show part of the
graph)
Fig. 7. Two (Valu,∼) graphs
5.2. The bound on leakage
Since the graph structure (X ,∼) of databases is both distance-regular and vertex-transitive, we can
apply Theorem 12 to the channel from X to Z . Then, by (5), it follows that, for j ∈ X〈d〉(x) (i.e., every
j in X at distance d from a given x), the transformed matrixM ′′ satisfiesM ′′x,j ≥ max
M′′/eǫd.
Each element j at distance d from x can be obtained by changing the value of d individuals in the u-
tuple representing i. These d individuals can be chosen in
(
u
d
)
possible ways, and for each of those we can
change the value (with respect to the one in x) in v−1 possible ways. Therefore |X〈d〉(x)| =
(
u
d
)
(v−1)d,
and the number of databases at distance d from any x must be a constant value nd given by
nd =
(
u
d
)
(v − 1)d. (7)
Using the value of nd from (7) in Theorem 12 we obtain a function Bnd of u, v and ǫ defined as
Bnd(u, v, ǫ) = u log
v eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
,
which is an upper bound for the leakage of the mechanism.
Theorem 15. IfK satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, then the information leakage is bounded from above as
I∞(X;Z) ≤ Bnd(u, v, ǫ).
The bound Bnd(u, v, ǫ) = u log v eǫ/(v−1+eǫ) is a continuous function in ǫ. As expected, this bound
has value 0 when ǫ = 0, since in this case all rows of the mechanism are identical, leading to no leakage.
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(a) u = 10 (lowest line), u = 100 (intermediate line), and
u = 1000 (highest line) for fixed v = 100 and varying ǫ
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(b) v = 2 (lowest line), v = 10 (intermediate line), and
v = 100 (highest line) for fixed u = 100 and varying ǫ
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(c) ǫ = 0.01 (lowest line), ǫ = 0.1 (intermediate line),
and ǫ = 0.5 (highest line) for fixed v = 100 and varying
u
Fig. 8. Graphs of Bnd(u, v, ǫ) for different configurations of u, v, ǫ
Also, the bound converges to u log v as ǫ approaches infinity. Intuitively, this is accordance with the
observation that the ratio between two elements in a same column in the matrix could become unbounded,
as ǫ approaches infinity. In this case, outputs could uniquely discriminate which input actually caused
them, and the posterior entropy of the channel could, in this extreme case, be zero. This would make the
leakage of the mechanism coincide with the priori entropy of the input. Since the entropy of the input
is maximum when the distribution on all possible vu databases is uniform, the worst-case leakage is
bounded by u log v. Figure 8 shows the growth of Bnd(u, v, ǫ) for different configurations of u, v, ǫ.
Choosing an appropriate value of the parameter ǫ in differential privacy is not trivial, and in general
one must consider several factors. The information contained in Figure 8 provides some insight into
the implications, in terms of vulnerability, of the choice of ǫ in differential privacy. For instance, with
u = 100, v = 2, and ǫ = 5, the min-entropy capacity can be a high as 99.03 bits, giving a posterior
vulnerability exceeding 1/2, which intuitively means that this combination of parameters is not safe.
The next proposition shows that the bound obtained is tight.
16
ca cb cc
ba bb bc
aa ab ac
(a) The datasets and their adja-
cency relation
aa ab ac ba ca bb bc cb cc
aa 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
ab 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
ac 1 1 0 2 2 2 1 2 1
ba 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 2
ca 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 1
bb 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 2
bc 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 2 1
cb 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 0 1
cc 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0
(b) The representation of the
matrix, where each generic entry
α stands for max
M
/eǫ α
Fig. 9. All possible databases and highest min-entropy leakage matrix giving ǫ-differential privacy for Example 17.
Proposition 16. For every u, v, and ǫ it is possible to define the mechanism K below, which provides
ǫ-differential privacy and whose min-entropy leakage, for the uniform input distribution, is I∞(X;Z) =
Bnd(u, v, ǫ).
Kx,z =
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu(eǫ)d
, for every input x and output z.
We now give an example of the use of Bnd(u, v, ǫ) as a bound for min-entropy leakage.
Example 17. Assume we are interested in the eye color of a certain population Ind = {Alice,Bob}.
Let Val = {a, b, c}, where a stands for absent (i.e., the null value), b stands for blue, and c stands
for coal black. Each dataset is a tuple x0x1 ∈ Val
2, where x0 represents the eye color of Alice (cases
x0 = b and x0 = c), or that Alice is not in the dataset (case x0 = a), whereas x1 provides the same
kind of information for Bob. Note that v = 3. Fig 9(a) represents the graph structure (X ,∼) of the
database domain, i.e., the set X of all possible datasets and its adjacency relation. Fig 9(b) represents
the matrix with input X which provides ǫ-differential privacy and has the highest min-entropy leakage.
In the representation of the matrix, the generic entry α stands for maxM/eǫ α, where maxM is the highest
value in the matrix, i.e.,maxM = 2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)/vu = (veǫ/v−1+eǫ)u · 1/vu = e2ǫ/(2+eǫ)2.
Bounds on leakage do not imply differential privacy
It is important to note that the converse of Theorem 15 does not hold, i.e., a bound on the min-entropy
leakage of a channel does not necessarily imply a bound on level of differential privacy of that channel
(i.e., on the parameter ǫ). One reason is that the min-entropy is defined as an expected value, i.e., it is the
result of averaging the contribution of all the columns to the leakage, while differential privacy represents
the worst-case. Hence, there could be a column which breaks differential privacy entirely, for instance in
the case in which the column contains both zero and non-zero elements, and whose leakage, yet, does not
contribute too much to the average (typically because the corresponding output has very low probability).
In this case, the min-entropy leakage can be very small, and yet ǫ-differential privacy does not hold for
any ǫ.
Another (related) reason is that min-entropy is sensitive to the values of the input distribution, whereas
differential privacy is not. The following example illustrates this point.
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Fig. 10. Input distribution and channel matrix for Example 18
Example 18. Let (X ,Y,M) be a channel such that |X | = n and |Y| = m. Assume that the channel
matrix is such that p(x1) = α and p(xi) =
1−α
n−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, and let p(y1 | x1) = β, p(yj |
x1) =
1−β
m−1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ m, and p(yj | xi) =
1
m
otherwise. This channel is represented in Figure 10.
Simple calculations show that the min-entropy leakage of the channel approaches 0 as α approaches 0,
independently of the value of β.
Differential privacy, however, depends only on the value of β, more precisely, the parameter of differ-
ential privacy ismax{ln 1
mβ
, lnmβ, ln m−1
m(1−β) , ln
m(1−β)
m−1 }, and such parameter is unbound and goes to
infinity as β approaches 0.
Leakage of “skinny” matrices (m < n)
The construction of the matrix for Proposition 16 gives a square matrix of dimension Valu × Valu.
Often, however, the range of K is fixed, as it is usually related to the possible answers to the query f .
Hence it is natural to consider the scenario in which we are given a number r < Valu, and want to
consider only thoseK’s whose range has cardinality at most r. Proposition 20 shows that in this restricted
setting we can find a better bound than that from Theorem 15.
Lemma 19. Let K be a mechanism with input X, where X = Valu, providing ǫ-differential privacy.
Assume that r = |Range(K)| = vℓ, for some ℓ < u. Let M be the matrix associated with K. Then it
is possible to build a square matrix M ′ of size vℓ × vℓ, with row and column indices in A ⊆ X , and a
binary relation ∼′⊆ A×A such that (A,∼′) is isomorphic to (Val ℓ,∼ℓ), and such that:
(i) M ′ is a channel matrix:
∑m−1
j=0 M
′
i,j = 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(ii) M ′i,j ≤ (e
ǫ)u−l+dM ′h,j for all i, h ∈ X and j ∈ Z , where d is the ∼
′-distance between i and h;
(iii) the elements of the diagonal are all equal to the maximum element of the matrix: M ′i,i = max
M ′
for all i ∈ X ; and
(iv) HM
′
∞ (X|Z) = H
M
∞ (X|Z), if X has the uniform distribution.
Now we are ready to prove the proposition.
Proposition 20. Let K be a mechanism with associated channel matrix M , and let r = |Range(K)|. If
K provides ǫ-differential privacy then the min-entropy leakage associated with K is bounded from above
as follows:
IM∞ (X;Z) ≤ log
r (eǫ)u
(v − 1 + eǫ)ℓ − (eǫ)ℓ + (eǫ)u
,
where ℓ = ⌊logv r⌋.
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The bound above can be significantly smaller than that from Theorem 15. For instance, when r = v it
becomes
log
v (eǫ)u
v − 1 + (eǫ)u
,
which for large values of u is much smaller than Bnd(u, v, ǫ). This does not contradict the fact that the
bound Bnd(u, v, ǫ) is strict—it is strict when we are free to choose the range, which here is fixed.
5.3. Leakage about an individual
Protecting an entire database is not the primary goal of differential privacy: some information is ex-
pected to be revealed, otherwise the query would not be useful. Instead, differential privacy aims at pro-
tecting the value of any single individual. We will see that its definition induces a straightforward bound
on the min-entropy leakage about a given individual.
Let i be an individual in the database, and let Xi the random variable that ranges over the values Val
and represents the value of our individual. Let X− = X \Xi be the random variable that represents the
values of all the other individuals in the database (after removing the individual i) and let us fix its value
to be the tuple x−. Let Z be the random variable that represents the answers of the mechanism over the
databases consisting of x− and the value of Xi, and consider the channel with input Xi, output Z , and
elements p(z|xi, x
−).
The min-entropy leakage about individual i, given knowledge of all other values in the database, can
be defined, as usual, in terms of the corresponding a priori and a posteriori min-entropies:
I∞(Xi;Z|X
− = x−) = H∞(Xi|X
− = x−)−H∞(Xi|Z,X
− = x−)
= log
∑
z p(z)maxxi p(xi|x
−, z)
maxxi p(xi|x
−)
≤ log
∑
z
p(z) ·max
xi
p(xi|x
−, z)
p(xi|x−)
(8)
Observe now that
p(xi|x
−, z)
p(xi|x−)
=
p(xi, x
−, z)
p(x−, z)
·
p(x−)
p(xi, x−)
=
p(xi, x
−, z)
p(xi, x−)
·
p(x−)
p(x−, z)
=
p(z|xi, x
−)
p(z|x−)
(9)
Note now that x = xi, x
− and x− are adjacent. Hence, if the mechanism respects ǫ-differential privacy,
we have p(z|xi,x−)/p(z|x−) ≤ eǫ. From (9) and (8) we therefore obtain:
I∞(Xi;Z|X
− = x−) ≤ log eǫ (10)
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The above bound is not very tight, because the inequality in (8) can be quite loose. With our model,
however, we can find a better bound by using Theorem 12, and the fact that the databases obtained by
fixing X− = x−, and varying Xi, are all adjacent to each other, i.e., they form a clique of v nodes. We
obtain:
Proposition 21. Assume that K satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Then the information leakage for an
individual is bounded from above by
I∞(Xi;Z|X
− = x−) ≤ log
v eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
.
Note that this bound on leakage for an individual neither depends on the size u of Ind , nor on the
database x− that we fix, which is in accordance with the fact that the guarantees provided by differential-
privacy are independent of any side information. Also note that the bound given by Proposition 21 differs
from that of (10) up to an additive correction of log v/(v−1+eǫ).
This correction is always non-positive, and it becomes non-negligible only when eǫ − 1 is comparable
to v. Since ǫ is usually taken to be a small constant, our bound gives the best improvement, with respect
to the straightforward one, when v is small. For instance, in a database that collects information about the
incidence of a certain disease in a population, we could have v = 3 (any individual is either affected, not
affected, or absent from the database). If we take ǫ = 1.35, the usual bound on leakage is log eǫ ≈ 1.95,
whereas our bound corrects it by an additive factor of log v/(v−1+eǫ) ≈ −0.97, meaning that our bound
is approximately 50% tighter.
6. Application to utility
In this section we consider the relation between differential privacy and the utility of oblivious mech-
anisms. In such mechanisms, utility is a property of the noise channel H of Figure 4, which maps true
answer y ∈ Y into reported answer z ∈ Z according to conditional probability given by Hy,z.
Note that leakage is a comparative measure, as it tells how much the adversary’s probability of success
has improved with respect to an initial situation. Utility, instead, is an absolute measure, as it is only
concerned about how much the output of the mechanism tells about the true answer to the query. Hence,
leakage is related to the difference between the a priori and a posteriori min-entropy of the channel,
whereas utility concerns only the a posteriori min-entropy. We use the results of Section 4 to derive
bounds on the utility ofH, and to construct the optimal mechanism.
We start by noting that the data analyst does not necessarily take the output z of the randomization
mechanism H as a guess for the true answer y, since some Bayesian post-processing can be applied to
maximize the probability of a correct guess. For each reported answer z the data analyst can remap their
guess to a value y′ ∈ Y according to some strategy.
The standard way to define utility is via gain functions (cfr. [6]). These are functions of the form
gain : Y ×Y → R, where gain(y, y′) represents the reward for an adversary who guesses the answer y′
when the correct answer is y. It is natural to define the utility of the noise channelH as the expected gain.
In the following definition, which formalizes this concept, p(y) is the prior probability of the true answer
y, and p(y′|y) is the probability of guessing y′ when the true answer is y. Note that the definition depends
implicitly on the reported answer z, since the data analyst guesses a y′ on the basis of the observed z.
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Definition 22. The utility of the noise matrix H is:
U(Y,Z) =
∑
y
p(y)
∑
y′
p(y′|y)gain(y, y′) (11)
The following characterization of the utility makes explicit the role of the observed z, and of the
remapping function used:
Proposition 23. Assuming that the data analyst uses a remapping function guess : Z → Y , we have
U(Y,Z) =
∑
y,z
p(y, z)gain(y, guess(z)). (12)
We focus here on the so-called identity gain function, which is defined as
gain id (y, y
′) =
{
1 if y = y′,
0 otherwise.
(13)
The use of identity gain functions in the context of differential privacy was also investigated by Ghosh
et al. [17].2 Let δx represent the “point” probability distribution which has value 1 on x and 0 elsewhere.
Hence
gain id (y, guess(z)) = δy(guess(z)).
Intuitively, the function gain id fits situations in which there is little reason to prefer one answer over
another, except if it is the correct answer. 3
By substituting gain with gain id in (12) we obtain
U(Y,Z) =
∑
y,z
p(y, z)δy(guess(z)), (14)
which tells us that the utility is highest when guess(z) = y is chosen to maximize p(y, z). Hence this is
the data analyst’s best strategy. Under such a maximizing remapping, we have
U(Y,Z) =
∑
z
max
y
p(y, z)
=
∑
z
max
y
(p(y) p(z|y)) (by the Bayes law) (15)
The formula thus obtained trepresents the Bayes risk, which is the converse of the min-vulnerability.
Thus there is a correspondence between U and the a posteriori min-entropy, expressed by the following
proposition.
2Instead of gain functions, [17] uses the dual notion of loss functions, but the final result is equivalent.
3 In more general cases, not studied here, the answer domain could be endowed with a notion of distance, and the gain
function could take into account the “proximity” of the reported answer to the true one. Intuitively, in this case a “close” answer,
even if wrong, should be considered better than a “distant” one.
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Proposition 24. Assume that function gain is the identity and the function guess is optimal. Then:
U(Y,Z) =
∑
z
max
y
(p(y) p(z|y)) = V (Y |Z) = 2−H∞(Y |Z).
6.1. The bound on utility and construction of the optimal mechanism
In this section we show that in some special cases, the fact that K provides ǫ-differential privacy de-
termines a bound on the utility under the identity gain function. We start by observing that the adjacency
relation on X induces, via the query f , an adjacency relation on Y:
Definition 25. Given y, y′ ∈ Y , with y 6= y′, we say that y and y′ are adjacent (notation y ∼ y′), if, and
only if, there exist x, x′ ∈ Valu with x ∼ x′ such that y = f(x) and y′ = f(x′).
Since ∼ is symmetric on databases, it is also symmetric on Y , therefore also (Y,∼) forms an undi-
rected graph.
Using the above concept of neighborhood for the inputs of the noise channelH, we can show that in an
oblivious mechanism of the form represented in Figure 4, K satisfies ǫ-differential privacy with respect
to neighbor databases if, and only if, H satisfies ǫ-differential privacy with respect to neighbor answers.
Proposition 26. In an oblivious setting (cf. Figure 4), if the query function f is deterministic, then the
mechanismK satisfies ǫ-differential privacy with respect to X if, and only if, the noise channelH satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy with respect to Y .
The link established by the above proposition will help us determine a bound on the utility of H.
Note that, as was also the case in the previous Section, the bounds derived in this Section depend on the
graph structure of the channel input satisfying either distance-regularity or vertex-transitivity. However,
whereas the graph structure on databases is guaranteed to always satisfy both types of symmetries, the
graph structure on true answers may present only one of them, or neither (cfr. Figure 2). Hence, the
two alternative ways of performing the second step of the matrix transformation of Figure 5 will be
particularly useful here.
In the following, we use nd to represent the number of nodes in Y at distance d from another node in
y ∈ Y . We recall that in any distance-regular or vertex-transitive graph, such number depends only on d
and not on y (cf. Proposition 5).
Theorem 27. Consider a noise channel H satisfying ǫ-differential privacy for some ǫ > 0. Assume that
the distribution of Y is uniform and that (Y,∼) is either distance-regular or vertex-transitive. Then we
have:
U(Y,Z) ≤
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
(16)
Provided (Y,∼) is distance-regular or vertex-transitive, the above bound is tight, in the sense that there
is a channel matrix whose utility coincides with the bound. Indeed, for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1, define H as
follows.
Hi,j =
γ
eǫ d(i,j)
, (17)
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where
γ =
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
. (18)
The following proposition shows that this definition gives a channel with maximal utility.
Theorem 28. Assume (Y,∼) is distance-regular or vertex-transitive and that the distribution of Y is
uniform. Then the matrix H defined by (17) is a channel matrix that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy and
has maximal utility:
U(Y,Z) =
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
Note that the definition of H given by (17) needs the condition of distance-regularity or vertex-
transitivity in order for nd to be defined. Furthermore, if the distribution on Y is not uniform, then the
utility of such H is not necessarily optimal. These are strong limitations for the results in this section,
because the structure of (Y,∼) and the distribution on Y depend on the query f , and in general the above
conditions are not granted by f .
6.2. Examples
Although our method for the construction of the optimal noise channel requires strong conditions
(distance-regularity or vertex-transitivity), there are some interesting scenarios in which they are satisfied.
Furthermore:
Remark 29. Our method can be applied also when the conditions of Theorem 28 are not met—we can
always add “artificial” adjacencies to the graph structure so as to meet those conditions. Instead of
(Y,∼), for computing the distance in (17) we use a structure (Y,∼′) that satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 28, and such that ∼⊆∼′. The matrix constructed in this way provides ǫ-differential privacy,
but may be non-optimal. In general, the smaller ∼′, the higher the utility.
The following are two simple scenarios in which the conditions are satisfied:
– (Y,∼) is a clique: every element has exactly |Y| − 1 adjacent elements.
– (Y,∼) is a ring: every element has exactly two adjacent elements. This is similar to the case of the
counting queries considered in [17], with the difference that our “counting” is in arithmetic modulo
|Y|.
The next two examples illustrate queries that give rise to the clique structure and to a line structure—
which is then transformed into a ring by adding artificial adjacencies to the graph—, and show the cor-
responding matrices. Note that the matrices generated by our method can be rather different, depending
on the structure of (Y,∼).
Example 30. Consider a database with electoral information in which each entry corresponds to a ballot
cast, which is described by three fields:
– elector: a unique (anonymized) identifier assigned to an elector;
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(a) M1: adapted truncated geometric mechanism
In/Out A B C D E F
A 0.534 0.060 0.053 0.046 0.040 0.267
B 0.465 0.069 0.060 0.053 0.046 0.307
C 0.405 0.060 0.069 0.060 0.053 0.353
D 0.353 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.060 0.405
E 0.307 0.046 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.465
F 0.267 0.040 0.046 0.053 0.060 0.534
(b) M2: our mechanism
In/Out A B C D E F
A 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
B 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
C 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
D 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7
E 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7
F 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7
Table 1
Mechanisms for the city with higher number of votes for candidate c
– candidate: the name of the candidate the elector voted for; and
– city: the name of the city where the ballot was cast.
Consider the query “What is the city with the greatest number of votes for a given candidate c?”,
and assume that the data analyst models the utility with the identity gain function.4 Note that every two
answers are neighbors, so the graph structure of the domain of answers is a clique.
Consider the scenario where the set of cities is City = {A,B,C,D,E, F} and assume for simplicity
that there is a unique answer for the query, i.e., there are no two cities with exactly the same number
of individuals voting for candidate c. Table 1 shows two alternative mechanisms providing ǫ-differential
privacy (with ǫ = ln 2).
The first one, M1, is based on the truncated geometric mechanism method used in [17] for counting
queries, here adapted to the case where every two distinct answers are neighbors. More precisely, the
mechanism is defined by mapping A, . . . , F into the interval of natural numbers [0, 6], then constructing
the truncated geometric mechanism as in [17], where the parameter α (representing the minimum ratio
between the elements of the matrix) is calculated imposing both the ǫ-differential privacy constraint (with
ǫ = ln 2) and that all natural numbers in [0, 6] are adjacent to each other. We obtain that α5 = 2, i.e.
α ≈ 1.5.
The second mechanism, M2, is constructed according to (17). Theorem 28 ensures that, for the uni-
form input distribution, M2 gives optimal utility. With the uniform input distribution, indeed, we have
U(M1) = 0.2243 < 0.2857 = U(M2).
Even for non-uniform distributions, our mechanism still provides better utility. For instance, for
p(A) = p(F ) = 1/10 and p(B) = p(C) = p(D) = P (E) = 1/5, we have U(M1) = 0.2415 <
0.2857 = U(M2). This should not come as a surprise: the geometric mechanism, as well as the Lapla-
cian mechanism, performs well when they are defined on the natural metrics of the answer domain. Here,
the structure [0, 6] is sort of imposed artificially.
Example 31. Consider the same database of the previous example, and assume now the query of interest
“What is the number of votes for candidate c?”. Each answer has at most two neighbors, and hence the
graph structure on the domain of answers is a line. Assume, for simplicity, that 5 individuals participated
in the election.
4Clearly there are more interesting gain function, for instance with a suitable gain function we could distinguish the case in
which the answer is totally wrong from an answer that is “almost correct” in the sense that the guessed town was the second
best for the candidate. However, this is out of the scope of this paper as here we consider only binary gain functions.
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(a) M1: truncated
1
2
-geom. mechanism
In/Out 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 2/3 1/6 1/12 1/24 1/48 1/48
1 1/3 1/3 1/6 1/12 1/24 1/24
2 1/6 1/6 1/3 1/6 1/12 1/12
3 1/12 1/12 1/6 1/3 1/6 1/6
4 1/24 1/24 1/12 1/6 1/3 1/3
5 1/48 1/48 1/24 1/12 1/6 2/3
(b) M2: our mechanism
In/Out 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 8/21 4/21 2/21 1/21 2/21 4/21
1 4/21 8/21 4/21 2/21 1/21 2/21
2 2/21 4/21 8/21 4/21 2/21 1/21
3 1/21 2/21 4/21 8/21 4/21 2/21
8 2/21 1/21 2/21 4/21 8/21 4/21
5 4/21 2/21 1/21 2/21 4/21 8/21
Table 2
Mechanisms for the counting query (5 voters)
Table 2 shows again the two mechanisms providing ǫ-differential privacy (ǫ = ln 2) that we considered
in previous example: the truncated geometric mechanism M1 (in which, now, α = 2, because we only
have the constraint of (ln 2)-differential privacy), and ours, M2. Note that in order to apply our method
we have first to apply Remark 29 to transform the graph structure from a line into a ring.
Considering the uniform prior distribution, the utility ofM1 is now greater than that ofM2: 4/9 versus
8/21, respectively. This does not contradict our theorem, because our matrix is guaranteed to be optimal
only in the case of a ring structure, not of a line as we have in this example. (In fact, if the structure
were a ring, i.e., if the last row were adjacent to the first one, then M1 would not provide ǫ-differential
privacy.) In case of a line, as here, the truncated geometric mechanism has been proved optimal [17].
7. Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the first work to investigate the relation between differential privacy
and information-theoretic leakage for an individual was [3]. Their definition of channel was for a given
database, and the channel inputs were all possible databases adjacent to it. Two bounds on leakage were
presented, one for the min-entropy, and one for Shannon entropy. Our bound in Proposition 21 improves
the min-entropy bound of [3].
Barthe and Köpf [5] were the first to investigate the more challenging connection between differential
privacy and the min-entropy leakage for the set of all possible databases. They considered “end-to-end”
differentially-private mechanisms, which correspond to what in this paper we call the mechanism K,
and proposed, like we do, to interpret these mechanisms as information-theoretic channels. Barthe and
Köpf provided a bound for leakage, but pointed out that it was not tight in general. They also observed
that for any number of individuals u and level of privacy ǫ one can construct a channel whose maximal
leakage is u log (2eǫ)/(eǫ+1), and concluded therefore that the bound must be at least as high as such
expression. Another difference between their work and ours is that [5] captures the case in which the
focus of differential privacy is on hiding participation of individuals in a database, whereas we consider
both the participation and the values of the individuals.
Clarkson and Schneider also considered differential privacy as a case study of their proposal for quan-
tification of integrity [11]. They analyzed database privacy conditions from the literature (such as differ-
ential privacy, k-anonymity, and l-diversity) for utility quantification. In particular, they studied the rela-
tionship between differential privacy and a notion of leakage (being different from ours as their definition
is based on Shannon entropy) and they provided a tight bound on leakage.
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Heusser and Malacaria [19] were among the first to explore the application of information-theoretic
concepts to databases queries. They proposed to model database queries as programs, which allows
for statistical analysis of the information leaked by the query. However, [19] did not relate information
leakage to differential privacy.
Ghosh et al. [17] aimed at obtaining optimal-utility mechanisms while preserving differential privacy.
They proposed adding noise to the output of the query according to the geometric mechanism. Their
framework provides a general definition of utility for a mechanism M that captures any possible side
information and preferences the users of M may have. They proved that the geometric mechanism is
optimal in the particular case of counting queries. Our results in Section 6 do not restrict to counting
queries, yet we only consider the case of the identity gain (loss) function.
Finally, our definition of the channel matrix in (17) corresponds to the exponential mechanism of
McSherry and Talwar [25] when the quality function relating two answers i and j is taken to be −d(i, j),
that is, the negative of the distance between them. Therefore, under the hypothesis of Theorem 27, it
follows that the exponential mechanism is an optimal way to maximize utility as measured by the identity
gain-function, while preserving differential privacy.
8. Conclusion
We have investigated the relations of ǫ-differential privacy with leakage, and utility, extending our
previous work [1,2]. Our main contribution has been the development of a general technique for deter-
mining these relations depending on the graph structure of the input domain, induced by the adjacency
relation and by the query. We have considered two particular structures, the distance-regular graphs, and
the vertex-transitive graphs, which allowed us to obtain tight bounds on leakage and on utility. We also
constructed an optimal noise channel satisfying ǫ-differential privacy for some special cases.
As future work, we plan to extend our result to other kinds of utility functions, among which we feel
promising the g-leakage framework [4].
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Appendix
Proofs are given in the order the corresponding results appear in the main text.
Before proceeding, we providing additional notation, definitions, and auxiliary results needed for the
proofs in the reminding of this section.
.1. Auxiliary notation, definitions, and results
Adjacency relation on channel outputs. At the end of the transformation operated by Lemma 7, and
after removing the all-zero columns, we have a square matrix in which the maximum of each column is in
the diagonal, as in Figure 11. On the columns B of this matrix we define a a graph structure derived from
that of A. This will be useful to prove the Step 2a and Step 2b of the matrix transformation in Section 4.
The definition is simply the following: given two elements j1, j2 ∈ B, we stipulate that j1 ∼ j2 if, and
only if, j1, j2 are also in A
5, and j1 ∼ j2 in A.
In this way (B,∼) is also a graph structure, and the notions of distance, diameter, set of vertices at
distance d from a given vertex, etc., are defined as usual. Also (A,∼) and (B,∼) are isomorphic hence
all the properties that hold for A hold also for B.
Automorphisms. Let (V,∼) be a graph, w,w′ ∈ V be two of its vertices, and let Γ be an automorphism
group for (V,∼). We define the set of automorphisms that map w to w′ as
Γw7→w′ = {σ ∈ Γ | σ(w) = w
′}.
Note that Γw7→w′ ∩ Γw7→w′′ = ∅ for all w′ 6= w′′, and that Γ =
⋃
w′ Γw7→w′ for any w ∈ V .
5Recall that for simplicity we represent the elements of A and B by their indexes.
row i Mi,0 . . . . . . . . . Mi,n−1Mi,j′
.
.
.
Mj′,j′ = max
M
j′
d(i, j′)
{ Mi,j′′.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mj′′,j′′ = max
M
j′′

 d(i, j′′)
M0,0 M0,1 . . .
M1,0 . . .
.
.
.
. . . M0,n−2 M0,n−1
. . . M1,n−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mn−2,0 . . .
Mn−1,0 Mn−1,1 . . .
.
.
.
. . . Mn−2,n−1
. . . Mn−1,n−2 Mn−1,n−1
Fig. 11. The relation between elements of a row i and the elements in the diagonal
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Lemma 32 states that in a vertex-transitive graph, starting from any vertex w, there exist as many
automorphisms mapping w to w′ as to any other vertex w′′. This auxiliary result is used in the proof of
Lemma 9.
Lemma 32. Let (V,∼) be a finite vertex-transitive graph, n = |V| and Γ its full automorphism group.
Then, for all w,w′,w′′ ∈ V:
|Γw7→w′ | = |Γw 7→w′′ | =
|Γ|
n
Proof. Given two automorphisms σ and ρ, let ρ ◦ σ denote the composition of ρ with σ, i.e., the auto-
morphism one would obtain by first applying σ to every vertex of the graph, and then applying ρ to the
resulting mapping. By extension, given an automorphism group Γ and an automorphism ρ, we write ρ◦Γ
for the automorphism group obtained by composing ρ with every σ ∈ Γ.
Assume that |Γw7→w′ | < |Γw7→w′′ | for some w,w′,w′′ ∈ V . Since the graph is vertex-transitive, there
exists an automorphism ρ such that ρ(w′′) = w′.
Consider the set of automorphisms ρ ◦ Γw7→w′′ . This set contains |Γw7→w′′ | distinct automorphisms
(since ρ ◦ σ = ρ ◦ σ′ implies σ = σ′). Moreover these automorphisms map w to w′, and therefore we
have ρ ◦ Γw7→w′′ ⊆ Γw7→w′ , which is a contradiction since by hypothesis we have |Γw7→w′ | < |Γw7→w′′ | =
|ρ ◦ Γw7→w′′ |.
Thus |Γw 7→w′ | ≥ |Γw 7→w′′ | and by exchanging w′,w′′ we get |Γw 7→w′ | = |Γw 7→w′′ |. Finally from Γ =⋃
w′ Γw7→w′ we get |Γw 7→w′ | =
|Γ|
n
.
.2. Preliminaries (Section 2)
Proposition 5. If a graph G = (V,∼) is distance-regular or vertex-transitive, then, for every distance
d ∈ ∆, there exists a constant nd which is equal to the cardinality of V〈d〉(w) for every w ∈ V .
Proof. Let us first examine the case in which G is distance-regular. Consider the alternative definition
of distance-regularity given by proposition 3, and assume w′ = w and j = k = d. We have V〈d〉(w) =
V〈j〉(w) ∩ V〈k〉(w
′) whose cardinality, by Proposition 3, depends only on j, k (both equal d), and on
d(w,w′). Finally, note that d(w,w′) = d(w,w) = 0.
Consider now the case in which G is vertex-transitive. Given two vertices w and w′, we have that there
exists an automorphism σ such that σ(w) = w′. By simple induction it can be shown that for every
d ∈ ∆, if V〈d〉(w) = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn}, then V〈d〉(w) = {σ(w1), σ(w2), . . . σ(wn)}, which means that
the cardinality of V〈d〉(w) depends only on d.
.3. Relating differential privacy and quantitative information flow (Section 4)
Lemma 7. (Step 1) Let M be a channel matrix of dimensions n × m s.t. n ≤ m, and assume that
M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Then it is possible to transform M into a matrix M ′ of the same
dimensions satisfying the following conditions:
(i) M ′ is a channel matrix:
∑m−1
j=0 M
′
i,j = 1, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(ii) each of the first n columns has a maximum in the diagonal: M ′i,i = max
M ′
i , for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(iii) them− n last columns only contain 0’s: M ′i,j = 0, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and all n ≤ j ≤ m− 1;
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(iv) M ′ satisfies ǫ-differential privacy: M ′i,j ≤ e
ǫM ′h,j , for all 0 ≤ i, h ≤ n − 1 s.t. i ∼ h and all
0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1; and
(v) HM
′
∞ (A|B) = H
M
∞ (A|B), if A has the uniform distribution.
Proof. For 0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, define Colk as the set of columns indexes j ofM which have maximum in
row k, and in no other row with index smaller than k, i.e.,
Colk = {j |Mk,j = max
M
j and ∀i < k. Mi,j < max
M
j }
Note that, by construction, each j belongs to exactly one set Colk. Consequently we have⋃
k
Colk = {0, 1, . . . ,m} (19)
and
Colh ∩ Colk = ∅ for h 6= k (20)
Note that some Colk may be empty. In particular, Colk = ∅ for all k > n.
Now, define the matrixM ′ as:
M ′ik =
∑
j∈Colk
Mij for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 , 0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1
We prove now thatM ′ satisfies the required properties.
It is easy to see thatM ′ is a valid channel matrix thanks to properties (19) and (20).
We prove now that the maximum of each column k ≤ n is in the diagonal (condition (ii)):
M ′kk =
∑
j∈Colk
Mkj ≥
∑
j∈Colk
Mij = M
′
ik
Condition (iii) is satisfied because Colk = ∅ for all k > n.
Furthermore, M ′ satisfies ǫ-differential privacy (condition (iv)):
M ′ik =
∑
j∈Colk
Mij ≤
∑
j∈Colk
eǫMhj = e
ǫ
∑
j∈Colk
Mhj = e
ǫM ′hk
Finally, observe that:
∑
k
maxM
′
k =
∑
k
M ′kk =
∑
k
∑
j∈Colk
Mkj =
∑
k
∑
j∈Colk
maxMj =
∑
j
maxMj
from which it immediately follows that HM
′
∞ (A|B) = H
M
∞ (A|B) (recall that A has the uniform distri-
bution and therefore the a posteriori entropy is a function of the sum of the maximum of each column),
so condition (v) is satisfied.
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Lemma 8. (Step 2a) LetM ′ be a square channel matrix of dimensions n×n that satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy. Let ∼ be an adjacency relation on A such that the graph (A,∼) is connected and distance-
regular. Assume that the maximum value of each column is on the diagonal, i.e., Mi,i = maxMi for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Then it is possible to transform M ′ into a matrix M ′′ of the same dimension satisfying
the following conditions:
(i) M ′′ is a channel matrix:
∑n−1
j=0 M
′′
i,j = 1, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(ii) the elements of the diagonal are all the same, and are equal to the maximum of the matrix: M ′′i,i =
maxM
′′
, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(iii) M ′′ satisfies ǫ-differential privacy: M ′i,j ≤ e
ǫM ′h,j , for all 0 ≤ i, h, j ≤ n− 1 s.t. i ∼ h; and
(iv) HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = H
M ′
∞ (A|B), if A has the uniform distribution.
Proof. We define each element M ′′i,j of the new matrix M
′′ as an averaging, or “smoothing”, of the
elements ofM ′ that are at same distance from i as j is:
M ′′i,j =
1
n|A〈d(i,j)〉(i)|
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A〈d(i,j)〉(k)
M ′h,k
We prove that this definitions satisfies Conditions (i) – (iv). We start with Condition (i).
∑
j∈B
M ′′i,j =
∑
j∈B
1
n|A〈d(i,j)〉(i)|
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A〈d(i,j)〉(k)
M ′h,k
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
∑
j∈B
1
|A〈d(i,j)〉(i)|
∑
h∈A〈d(i,j)〉(k)
M ′h,k
Note that for every i, B =
⋃
d∈∆ B〈d〉(i), and for different values of d the sets B〈d〉(i) are disjoint.
Therefore by splitting the summation over j ∈ B we obtain
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
∑
d∈∆
∑
j∈B〈d〉(i)
1
|A〈d〉(i)|
∑
h∈A〈d〉(k)
M ′h,k
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
∑
d∈∆
∑
h∈A〈d〉(k)
M ′h,k
∑
j∈B〈d〉(i)
1
|A〈d〉(i)|
since
∑
j∈B〈d〉(i)
1
|A〈d〉(i)|
=
∑
j∈A〈d〉(i)
1
|A〈d〉(i)|
= 1 (recall that the definition of distance in B is given as
that in A), we obtain
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
∑
d∈∆
∑
h∈A〈d〉(k)
M ′h,k
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and now the summations over h and d can be joined together
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A
M ′h,k
now, reorganizing the summations, and considering that M ′ is a channel matrix, and that |B| = n we
have
=
1
n
∑
h∈A
∑
k∈B
M ′h,k
=
1
n
∑
h∈A
1
= 1
which implies that condition (i) is satisfied.
We now turn our attention to the elements of the diagonal, which are all identical because M ′′i,i =
1
n
∑
k∈BM
′
k,k. To fulfill condition (ii) we still need to show thatM
′′
i,i = max
M ′′
i for all i ∈ A.
M ′′i,j =
1
n|A〈d(i,j)〉(i)|
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A〈d(i,j)〉(k)
M ′h,k
≤
1
n|A〈d(i,j)〉(i)|
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A〈d(i,j)〉(k)
M ′k,k (since the biggest element
is in the diagonal)
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
M ′k,k
1
|A〈d(i,j)〉(i)|
∑
h∈A〈d(i,j)〉(k)
1
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
M ′k,k
|A〈d(i,j)〉(k)|
|A〈d(i,j)〉(i)|
and because the graph is distance-regular, the number of vertices at any arbitrary distance (and, in par-
ticular, at distance d(i, j)) from any vertice is always the same. Hence |A〈d(i,j)〉(k)| = |A〈d(i,j)〉(i)| and
we can conclude
=
1
n
∑
k∈B
M ′k,k · 1
= M ′′i,i
33
Since A has the uniform distribution, the conditional min-entropy HM
′′
∞ (A|B) is given by the sum of
the maximum elements of each column of M ′′. Since this sum is preserved in the transformation, we
have HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = H
M ′
∞ (A|B), hence Condition (iv) is satisfied.
It remains to show thatM ′′ satisfies ǫ-differential privacy (condition (iii)).
Since d(i, i′) = 1, from the triangular inequality we have:
d(i′, j) − 1 ≤ d(i, j) ≤ d(i′, j) + 1
Thus, there are 3 possible cases:
1. d(i, j) = d(i′, j)
The result is immediate sinceM ′′i,j = M
′′
i′,j .
2. d(i, j) = d(i′, j) − 1
We define the set of neighbors of h “one step further away” from k:
Fh,k = {h
′ ∼ h | h′ ∈ A〈d(h,k)+1〉(k)}
Equivalently, we can see Fh,k as the set of neighbors of h that are not at distance d(h, k) − 1 or
d(h, k) from k. Since the graph is distance-regular, the number of elements in this set is given
by the intersection number bd(h,k), i.e., |Fh,k| = bd(h,k). The following inequalities hold for any
h, h′ ∈ A:
M ′h,k ≤ e
ǫM ′h′,k ∀h
′ ∈ Fh,k (diff. privacy)⇒
bd(h,k)M
′
h,k ≤ e
ǫ
∑
h′∈Fh,k
M ′h′,k (sum of the above)
Fix now a distance d and sum the above inequalities for all vertices at distance d from k:
∑
h∈A〈d〉(k)
bdM
′
h,k ≤ e
ǫ
∑
h∈A〈d〉(k)
∑
h′∈Fh,k
M ′h′,k
Note that, being the graph distance-regular, and by the definition of the intersection number cd+1,
each h′ ∈ A〈d+1〉(k) is contained in Fh,k for exactly cd+1 different h ∈ A〈d〉(k). So the right-
hand side above sums all vertices of A〈d+1〉(k) exactly cd+1 times each. Thus we get that for all
k ∈ B, d ∈ ∆:
bd
∑
h∈A〈d〉(k)
M ′h,k ≤ e
ǫ cd+1
∑
h∈A〈d+1〉(k)
M ′h,k (21)
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Finally, note that cd+1|A〈d+1〉(i)| = bd|A〈d〉(i)| (both sides count the number of edges between a
vertex at distance d and a vertex at distance d+ 1) and therefore we have
cd+1
bd
=
|A〈d〉(i)|
|A〈d+1〉(i)|
Now we pick d = d(i, j) to conclude that
M ′′i,j =
1
n|A〈d〉(i)|
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A〈d〉(k)
M ′h,k
≤ eǫ
1
n|A〈d〉(i)|
cd+1
bd
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A〈d+1〉(k)
M ′h,k (from (21))
= eǫ
1
n|A〈d+1〉(i)|
∑
k∈B
∑
h∈A〈d+1〉(k)
M ′h,k
= eǫM ′′i′,j.
3. d(i, j) = d(i′, j) + 1
This case is analogous to the case where d(i, j) = d(i′, j) − 1.
Lemma 9. (Step 2b) Consider a square channel matrix M ′ satisfying the assumptions of Lemma 8,
except that we assume (A,∼) to be vertex-transitive instead of distance-regular. Then it is possible to
transform M ′ into a matrixM ′′ with the same properties as in Lemma 8.
Proof. Let Γ be the automorphism group of (A,∼). Since (A,∼) and (B,∼) are isomorphic, it follows
that Γ is also the automorphism group of (B,∼). For all i, j ∈ A we define the elements ofM ′′ as:
M ′′i,j =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
M ′σ(i),σ(j)
We now show thatM ′′ satisfies Conditions (i) – (iv). We start with Condition (i):
n−1∑
j=0
M ′′i,j =
n−1∑
j=0
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
M ′σ(i),σ(j)
=
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
n−1∑
j=0
M ′σ(i),σ(j)
=
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
1 (sinceMσ(i),· is a prob. distribution)
= 1
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Then we show thatM ′′i,i = M
′′
j,j for all i, j ∈ A.
M ′′i,i =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
M ′σ(i),σ(i)
=
1
|Γ|
n−1∑
k=0
∑
σ∈Γi7→k
M ′σ(i),σ(i) (since Γ =
⋃
k
Γi 7→k)
=
1
|Γ|
n−1∑
k=0
∑
σ∈Γi7→k
M ′k,k (σ(i) = k since σ ∈ Γi 7→k)
=
1
|Γ|
n−1∑
k=0
M ′k,k|Γi 7→k|
=
1
|Γ|
n−1∑
k=0
M ′k,k
|Γ|
n
(by Lemma 32)
=
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
M ′k,k
And we can conclude that every element in the diagonal ofM ′′ is the same, as they are the average of
the diagonal elements of M ′. To fulfil condition (ii) we still need to show that M ′′j,j = max
M ′′
j for all
j ∈ A.
M ′′j,j =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
M ′σ(j),σ(j)
≥
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
M ′σ(h),σ(j) (for all h ∈ A, since all maxima
are in the diagonal ofM ′)
= M ′′h,j
Then we show that M ′′ provides ǫ-differential privacy (condition (iii)). Let i, h ∈ A such that i ∼ h.
Note that σ(i) ∼ σ(h) for all σ ∈ Γ since σ is an automorphism. Thus for all j ∈ A we have:
M ′′i,j =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
M ′σ(i),σ(j)
≤
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
eǫM ′σ(h),σ(j) (ǫ-diff. priv. ofM,σ(i) ∼ σ(h))
= eǫM ′′h,j
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Finally, we show that HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = H
M ′
∞ (A|B) (condition (iv)).
HM
′′
∞ (A|B) = − log
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
M ′′i,i (the maxima ofM
′′ are in
the diagonal and are all equal)
= − log
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
M ′σ(i),σ(i)
= − log
1
n
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
n−1∑
i=0
M ′σ(i),σ(i)
= − log
1
n
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
n−1∑
i=0
M ′i,i (because σ is an automorphism)
= − log
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
M ′i,i
= HM
′
∞ (A|B) (the maxima ofM are
also in the diagonal)
Proposition 11. Let M be a channel matrix satisfying ǫ-differential privacy where for every 0 ≤ i ≤
n− 1 we have Mi,i = maxM . Then, for every node i ∈ A,
maxM ≤ 1∑
d∈∆
|A〈d〉(i)|
eǫd
,
Proof. The elements of any given row i of M represent a probability distribution, so they sum up to 1:∑
jMi,j = 1. Then we can derive the following inequalities.
∑
j
(
maxM
eǫd(i,j)
)
≤ 1 (by (5))
∑
d∈∆
(
|A〈d〉(i)|
maxM
eǫd
)
≤ 1 (grouping elements by distance)
And from the above we can conclude.
maxM ≤
1∑
d∈∆
|A〈d〉(i)|
eǫd
37
Theorem 12. Consider a channel matrix M satisfying ǫ-differential privacy for some ǫ ≥ 0, assume
that the probability distribution on A is uniform, and that (A,∼) is either distance-regular or vertex-
transitive. Then
HM∞ (A|B) ≥ − log
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
. (6)
In case the matrix M can be transformed via Lemmata 7, 8, and 9 into a matrix M ′′ whose elements
all satisfy (5) with equality, then the bound (6) holds with equality.
Proof. The inequality follows directly from (3) and Proposition 11.
To prove the second part of the result, note that if a (transformed) matrix M ′′ is such that all of its
elements satisfy (5) with equality, then trivially condition bound (6) also holds with equality. Recalling
that the transformations given by Lemmata 7, 8, and 9 do not change the a posterior min-entropy of the
channel, ifM ′′ satisfies (6) with equality, so doesM .
.4. Application to leakage (Section 5)
Proposition 13. If v ≥ 2, the graph (Valu,∼) is a connected distance-regular graph with diameter
dmax = u, and intersection numbers bd = (u− d)(v − 1) and cd = d, for all 0 ≤ d ≤ dmax .
Proof. The vertices of (Valu,∼) are u-tuples (val1, . . . , valu), val i ∈ Val and two vertices are adjacent
if, and only if, they differ in exactly one element val i. Then the distance between two vertices is the
number of elements in which they differ. Let x1, x2 ∈ Val
u with d(x1, x2) = d, so they differ in exactly
d elements. To go at distance d + 1 from x1 we can select any of the remaining u − d elements and
change it in v − 1 possible ways, so the total number is (u − d)(v − 1), which only depends on d, not
on x1, x2. Similarly, by changing one of the differing elements of x2 to match the value of x1 we get a
vertex at distance d− 1, and there are d such elements.
Proposition 14. The graph (Valu,∼) is a vertex-transitive graph.
Proof. The Hamming graph is the Cartesian product of u complete graphs of size v. Complete graphs
are trivially vertex-transitive and it is known [20] that a Cartesian product is vertex-transitive if, and only
if, each of its factors is so.
Theorem 15. IfK satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, then the information leakage is bounded from above as
I∞(X;Z) ≤ Bnd(u, v, ǫ).
Proof. We start by deriving the following.
∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫd
=
∑
d∈∆
(
u
d
)
(v − 1)d
eǫd
(by (7))
=
1
eǫu
∑
d∈∆
(
u
d
)
(v − 1)deǫ(u−d) (multiplying each
term by eǫu/eǫu)
=
(v − 1 + eǫ)u
eǫu
(by binomial expansion) (22)
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And we can use the above in Theorem 12 as follows.
HM∞ (A|B) ≥ − log
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
(by Theorem 12)
= − log
1
(v−1+eǫ)u/eǫu
(by (22))
= − log
(
eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
)u
(23)
Since by hypothesis the input distribution is uniform, the min-entropy of X is maximum, i.e.,
H∞(X) = log |Val
u|. We then use this fact to derive that
IM∞ (X;Y ) = H∞(X) −H
M
∞ (X|Y ) (by definition)
≤ log vu + log
(
eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
)u
(by (23))
= u log
v eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
Proposition 16. For every u, v, and ǫ it is possible to define the mechanism K below, which provides
ǫ-differential privacy and whose min-entropy leakage, for the uniform input distribution, is I∞(X;Z) =
Bnd(u, v, ǫ).
Kx,z =
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu(eǫ)d
, for every input x and output z.
Proof. The adjacency relation in X determines a graph structure (X ,∼). Let Z = X and define the
matrix of K as follows, where d = d(x, z):
p(z|x) =
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu(eǫ)d
(24)
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We need to show that p(·|x) is a probability distribution for every x:
∑
z∈Z
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu(eǫ)d
=
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu
∑
z∈Z
1
(eǫ)d
=
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu
∑
d∈∆
nd
(eǫ)d
=
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu
·
1
maxM
(by Proposition 11)
=
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu
·
vue0
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
(max occurs when d = 0 in (24))
= 1
We now show that K provides ǫ-differential privacy. For every x, x′ ∈ X such that x ∼ x′, and for
every z ∈ Z we have:
p(z|x)
p(z|x′)
=
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu(eǫ)d(x,z)
·
vu(eǫ)d(x
′,z)
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
(by (24))
= eǫ(d(x
′,z)−d(x,z))
≤ eǫd(x,x
′) (by the triangle inequality)
= eǫ (d(x, x′) = 1 since x ∼ x′)
Finally, let us calculate I∞(X;Z) = H∞(X) − H∞(X|Z). Since input distribution is uniform, we
have:
H∞(X) =− log
1
vu
Moreover, we know from (3) that H∞(X|Z) = − log max
M ′′ , and to obtain the maximum value we
take d = 0 in (24):
H∞(X|Z) =− log
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vue0
=− log
2Bnd(u,v,ǫ)
vu
Now, by subtracting the value of H∞(X|Z) from the value of H∞(X) we obtain I∞(X;Z) =
Bnd(u, v, ǫ).
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Lemma 19. Let K be a mechanism with input X, where X = Valu, providing ǫ-differential privacy.
Assume that r = |Range(K)| = vℓ, for some ℓ < u. Let M be the matrix associated with K. Then it
is possible to build a square matrix M ′ of size vℓ × vℓ, with row and column indices in A ⊆ X , and a
binary relation ∼′⊆ A×A such that (A,∼′) is isomorphic to (Val ℓ,∼ℓ), and such that:
(i) M ′ is a channel matrix:
∑m−1
j=0 M
′
i,j = 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(ii) M ′i,j ≤ (e
ǫ)u−l+dM ′h,j for all i, h ∈ X and j ∈ Z , where d is the ∼
′-distance between i and h;
(iii) the elements of the diagonal are all equal to the maximum element of the matrix: M ′i,i = max
M ′
for all i ∈ X ; and
(iv) HM
′
∞ (X|Z) = H
M
∞ (X|Z), if X has the uniform distribution.
Proof. (Sketch) We first apply a procedure similar to that of Lemma 7 to construct a square matrix of
size vℓ× vℓ which has the maximum values of each column in the diagonal. (In this case we construct an
injection from the columns to rows containing their maximum value, and we eliminate the rows that at the
end are not associated with any column.) Then define ∼′ as the projection of ∼u on Val
ℓ, which satisfies
condition (ii). Finally, apply the procedure in Lemma 8, or equivalently the procedure in Lemma 9, on
the structure (X ,∼′) to make all elements in the diagonal equal to the maximum element of the matrix
(condition (iii)). Note that this procedure preserves the property of condition (ii), and conditional min-
entropy (condition (iv)). Also the matrix obtained is a valid channel matrix (condition (i)).
Proposition 20. Let K be a mechanism with associated channel matrix M , and let r = |Range(K)|. If
K provides ǫ-differential privacy then the min-entropy leakage associated with K is bounded from above
as follows:
IM∞ (X;Z) ≤ log
r (eǫ)u
(v − 1 + eǫ)ℓ − (eǫ)ℓ + (eǫ)u
,
where ℓ = ⌊logv r⌋.
Proof. We first consider the case where r = vℓ for some ℓ. We transform the matrix M associated with
K by applying Lemma 19, and letM ′ be the resulting matrix. Let maxM
′
be the value of every element
in the diagonal ofM ′, i.e., maxM
′
= M ′i,i for every row i, and let A
′
〈d〉(i) be the set of elements whose
∼′-distance from i is d. Note that for every j ∈ A′〈d〉(i) we have thatM
′
j,j ≤M
′
i,j(e
ǫ)u−ℓ+d, hence
M ′i,j ≥
maxM
′
(eǫ)u−ℓ+d
Furthermore each element j at ∼′-distance d from i can be obtained by changing the value of d indi-
viduals in the ℓ-tuple representing i (remember that (A,∼′) is isomorphic to (Val ℓ,∼ℓ)). We can choose
those d individuals in
(
ℓ
d
)
possible ways, and for each of these individuals we can change the value (with
respect to the one in i) in v − 1 possible ways. Therefore
|A′〈d〉(i)| =
(
ℓ
d
)
(v − 1)d
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Taking into account that forM ′i,i we need not to divide by (e
ǫ)u−ℓ+d, we obtain:
maxM
′
+
∑ℓ
d=1
(
ℓ
d
)
(v − 1)d max
M ′
(eǫ)u−ℓ+d
≤
∑
jM
′
i,j
Since each row represents a probability distribution, the elements of row i must sum up to 1. Hence:
maxM
′
+
∑ℓ
d=1
(
ℓ
d
)
(v − 1)d max
M ′
(eǫ)u−ℓ+d
≤ 1 (25)
Simple calculations, similar to those of the proof of Theorem 15, give:
maxM
′
≤ (e
ǫ)u
(v−1+eǫ)ℓ−(eǫ)ℓ+(eǫ)u
Therefore:
IM
′
∞ (X;Z) = H∞(X) −H
M ′
∞ (X|Z) (by definition) (26)
= log vu + log
vℓ∑
j=1
maxM
′ 1
vu
(27)
= log vu + log
1
vu
+ log(vℓmaxM
′
) (28)
≤ log
vℓ (eǫ)u
(v − 1 + eǫ)ℓ − (eǫ)ℓ + (eǫ)u
(by (25) ) (29)
Consider now the case in which r is not of the form vℓ. Let ℓ be the maximum integer such that vℓ < r,
and let m = r − vℓ. Transform the matrix M associated with K by collapsing the m columns with
the smallest maxima into the m columns with highest maxima. I.e., let j1, j2, . . . , jm the indices of the
columns which have smallest maxima values, i.e.,maxMjt ≤ max
M
j for every column j 6= j1, j2, . . . , jm.
Similarly, let k1, k2, . . . , km be the indices of the columns with maximum values. Recalling the definition
of the “collapsing” operator introduced in Section 4.1, we define
N = M [j1 → k1][j2 → k2] . . . [jm → km]
Finally, eliminate them all-zero columns to obtain a matrix with exactly vℓ columns. It is easy to show
that
IM∞ (X;Z) ≤ I
N
∞(X;Z)
r
vℓ
After transforming N into a matrix M ′ with the same min-entropy leakage as described in the first
part of this proof, from (26) we conclude
IM∞ (X;Z) ≤ I
M ′
∞ (X;Z)
r
vℓ
≤ log
r (eǫ)u
(v − 1 + eǫ)ℓ − (eǫ)ℓ + (eǫ)u
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Proposition 21. Assume that K satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Then the information leakage for an
individual is bounded from above by
I∞(Xi;Z|X
− = x−) ≤ log
v eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
.
Proof. Fix a database x, and a particular individual i in Ind . The possible ways in which we can change
the value of i in x are v−1. All the new databases obtained in this way are adjacent to each other, i.e., the
graph structure associated with the input is a clique of v nodes. Recall that nd is the number of elements
of the input at distance d from a given element x. In this case we have
nd =


1 for d = 0,
v − 1 for d = 1,
0 otherwise.
By substituting this value of nd in Theorem 12, we get
H∞(Xi|Z,X
− = x−) ≥ − log
1
1 +
v − 1
eǫ
= − log
eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
(30)
The particular individual can present v different values, and thus in the case the input distribution is
uniform its min-entropy is H∞(Xi|X
− = x−) = log v.
I∞(Xi;Z|X
− = x−) = H∞(Xi|X
− = x−)−H∞(Xi|Z,X
− = x−) (by definition)
≤ log v + log
eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
(by (30))
= log
v eǫ
v − 1 + eǫ
Since the min-entropy leakage is maximum in the case of the uniform input distribution, the result
follows.
.5. Application to utility (Section 6)
Proposition 23. Assuming that the data analyst uses a remapping function guess : Z → Y , we have
U(Y,Z) =
∑
y,z
p(y, z)gain(y, guess(z)). (12)
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Proof. Let δx represent the probability distribution which has value 1 on x and 0 elsewhere.
U(Y,Z) =
∑
y
p(y)
∑
y′
p(y′|y)gain(y, y′) (by (11))
=
∑
y
p(y)
∑
y′
(∑
z
p(z|y)p(y′|z)
)
gain(y, y′)
=
∑
y
p(y)
∑
y′
(∑
z
p(z|y)δy′(guess(z))
)
gain(y, y′) (as y′ = guess(z))
=
∑
y
p(y)
∑
z
p(z|y)
∑
y′
δy′(guess(z))gain(y, y
′)
=
∑
y
p(y)
∑
z
p(z|y)gain(y, guess(z))
=
∑
y,z
p(y, z)gain(y, guess(z)) (31)
Proposition 24. Assume that function gain is the identity and the function guess is optimal. Then:
U(Y,Z) =
∑
z
max
y
(p(y) p(z|y)) = V (Y |Z) = 2−H∞(Y |Z).
Proof. Just substitute (15) in the definition of conditional min-entropy:H∞(Z | Y ) = − log
∑
z maxy((p(y) p(z|y)).
Proposition 26. In an oblivious setting (cf. Figure 4), if the query function f is deterministic, then the
mechanismK satisfies ǫ-differential privacy with respect to X if, and only if, the noise channelH satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy with respect to Y .
Proof. The probability of K producing an arbitrary reported answer z given an arbitrary database x can
be calculated as
Kx,z =
∑
y
p(y|x) · Hy,z (since the mechanism is oblivious)
= p(f(x)|x) · Hf(x),z (since y = f(x) is deterministic)
= Hf(x),z (since p(f(x)|x) = 1)
Hence, it follows immediately that
Kx,z
Kx′,z
≤ eǫ if, and only if,
Hf(x),z
Hf(x′),z
≤ eǫ.
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Theorem 27. Consider a noise channel H satisfying ǫ-differential privacy for some ǫ > 0. Assume that
the distribution of Y is uniform and that (Y,∼) is either distance-regular or vertex-transitive. Then we
have:
U(Y,Z) ≤
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
(16)
Proof. Since (Y,∼) is distance-regular or vertex-transitive, and the distribution on Y is uniform, we can
apply Theorem 12 to derive that HM∞ (Z|Y ) ≥ − log
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
. Then we just substitute this result in
Proposition 24.
Theorem 28. Assume (Y,∼) is distance-regular or vertex-transitive and that the distribution of Y is
uniform. Then the matrix H defined by (17) is a channel matrix that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy and
has maximal utility:
U(Y,Z) =
1∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫ d
Proof. First we prove that the matrix as defined in (17) is a channel matrix, i.e., that each row is a
probability distribution.
∑
j∈Z
Hi,j =
∑
j∈Z
γ
eǫd(i,j)
= γ
∑
j∈Z
1
eǫd(i,j)
= γ
∑
d∈∆
nd
eǫd
(by (18))
= γ
1
γ
= 1
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Now we show that the mechanism respects ǫ-differential privacy. For every i, i′ such that i ∼ i′ and
every j:
Hi,j
Hi′,j
=
γ
eǫd(i,j)
·
eǫd(i
′,j)
γ
(by definition of H)
=
eǫd(i
′,j)
eǫd(i,j)
= eǫ(d(i
′,j)−d(i,j))
≤ eǫd(i
′,i) (by the triangular inequality)
= eǫ (since i ∼ i′, d(i, i′) = 1)
Finally, we show that the utility is maximum.
U(Y,Z) =
∑
z∈Z
max
y
(p(y)H(z|y)) (by (15))
=
∑
z∈Z
max
y
1
|Y|
H(z|y) (since Y is uniform)
=
1
|Y|
∑
z∈Z
max
y
γ
mind eǫd(z,y)
(by (17))
=
1
|Y|
∑
z∈Z
γ (maximum is d = 0)
=
1
|Y|
· |Z|γ
= γ (since |Y| = |Z| = n)
